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THE MIGRANT LABOR CAMPS: ENCLAVES OF
ISOLATION IN OUR MIDST
ELIZABETH J. duFRESNE* AND JOHN J. McDONNELL**
I.

INTRODUCTION

T HIS century has seen the evolution of America from a nation of rural

communities into an urban-suburban society; 1 most of our domestic
problems arise in an urban context; much of our national concern centers
on improving the quality of the cities and their environs where most
of the nation lives and works. It is therefore understandable, though not
condonable, that many Americans have only very recently become even
barely cognizant of the desperate existence of the migrant farm workers.
However, news items of recent years reporting such events as the attempts
of Cesar Chavez to unionize the California farm workers,2 the national
table grape boycott,3 and the discovery of the bodies of twenty-four slain
migrant farm workers outside Yuba City, California," have increased
public awareness and curiosity about the conditions of day-to-day living
among the one million5 migrant farm workers in this country.

* Member of the Florida bar; B.A., Vanderbilt University; J.D., University of Florida
School of Law; the author represented migrant laborers for four years as an employee of
Economic Opportunities Legal Services, Inc., in Miami.
** A.B., Boston College; J.)., Fordham Law School; Associated with the firm of Cabi,
Gordon, Sonnett, Reindel & Ohl, New York, New York.
1. The process has by no means been arrested. In 1950, 64 percent of the American
population resided in "urban" areas; by 1960, the percentage had increased to 69.9 percent.
U.S. Dep't of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, Statistical Abstract of the United States,
1970, table 15, at 16 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Statistical Abstract]. Furthermore, by
1969 only 5.1 percent actually resided on farms. Id., table 14, at 16.
2. The travails of the United Farm Workers Organizing Committee (UFWOC), formed
out of an alliance between Chavez and the AFL-CIO, in gaining the recognition of California
growers has been the subject of several books and articles. For a brief discussion of their
accomplishments see text accompanying notes 109-14 infra. See generally P. Fusco &
G. Horwitz, La Causa: The California Grape Strike (1970); P. Matthiessen, Sal Si Puedes:
Cesar Chavez and the New American Revolution (1969); Berman & Hightower, Battle for
Lettuce: Chavez and the Teamsters, The Nation, Nov. 2, 1970, at 427; Dunne, To Die
Standing: Cesar Chavez and the Chicanos, The Atlantic, June, 1971, at 39; Meister, "La
Huelga" Becomes "La Causa," N.Y. Times, Nov. 17, 1968, § 6 (Magazine), at S2.
3. See generally Meister, supra note 2; Taylor, Huelga, The Boycott That Worked, The
Nation, Sept. 7, 1970, at 167; N.Y. Times, April 5, 1970, § 1, at 70, col. 4; id.,
April 2,
1970, at 29, col. 2.
4. See N.Y. Times, June 4, 1971, at 36, col. 2; id., May 30, 1971, § 1, at 21, col 1; id.,
May 27, 1971, at 1, col 7. The total degradation of these migrants' humanity is evidenced
by the fact that the deceased migrants suffered such social isolation that they were generally
not missed for weeks. Id., June 1, 1971, at 1, coL 6.
5. Population figures for migrant workers are difficult to determine accurately. See L.
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An examination of these conditions reveals a life of poverty and deprivation' totally incongruous with the general level of affluence throughout the nation. In brief, the migrant farm worker ranks among the lowest
paid,7 least educated,' worst fed, 9 and worst housed'0 persons in the
United States.
Shotwell, The Harvesters 31-34 (1961). It has been stated that "reliable" estimates range
from one million to three million. Interview with Saul Shulman, sociologist, University of
Florida, March, 1968.
6. Especially illustrative was a National Broadcasting Company presentation. Transcript
of Migrant, an NBC White Paper, July 16, 1970 [hereinafter cited as White Paper]. Several
books depict the everyday life of the migrant farmworker. See, e.g., L. Shotwell, supra note
5; J. Stewart & S. Sandage, Child of Hope (1968) (a photographic essay); D. Wright, They
Harvest Despair (1965).
7. Estimates as to the annual income of the individual migrant farm worker are as low
as $891. White Paper 12. The figures vary, however; one report estimates that in a good
year a family with two adult workers earns approximately $3,500. President's Nat'l Advisory
Comm'n on Rural Poverty, Rural Poverty in the United States 452 (1968). In the Atlantic
coastal states the estimated hourly wage (neither room nor board provided) varies from a
high of $1.41 in New Jersey to a low of $0.74 in South Carolina. Id. at 451. In four Texas
counties in the lower Rio Grande valley (the "home" of many of the migrants who harvest
the crops on the "mid-continent" route north through the midwest to Michigan), approximately 52 percent of the families earn less than $3,000. Hearings Before the Subcomm. on
Migratory Labor of the Comm. on Labor and Public Welfare, 91st Cong., 1st & 2d Sesw.,
pt. 8-B, at 5425 (1970) [hereinafter cited as 1970 Hearings]. The median family income in
1968 was $8,785 for nonfarm families, and $5,769 for farm families. Statistical Abstract,
table 492, at 324.
8. "'Migrant agricultural workers are often described as America's forgotten people and
their children are referred to as the most educationally deprived group of children In our
Nation. They enter school late, their attendance is poor, their progress is slow, they drop
out early; consequently their illiteracy is high. Studies indicate that most migrant children
are far below grade level and that their school achievement is usually under fourth grade.'"
President's Nat'l Advisory Comm'n on Rural Poverty, The People Left Behind 49 (1967),
quoting A. Celebrezze, former Secretary of Health, Education & Welfare; see S. Rep. No. 71,
90th Cong., 1st Sess. 25 (1967). See also S. Rep. No. 155, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 11 (1965);
S. Rep. No. 167, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 7 (1963). At least one state, New Jersey, took steps
twenty years ago to improve the educational opportunities of migrant children by establishing summer schools. Tobin, One Million Migrants, Saturday Review, Aug. 17, 1968, at 14.
See generally White Paper 33-45.
9. Malnutrition and other diseases are present in significantly greater proportions among
migrant farm workers than among the American populace in general. Dr. H. Peter Chase
has stated that malnutrition among migrant children is ten times that of the "average"
American child. N.Y. Times, Feb. 24, 1971, at 24, col. 3. Testimony before a Senate subcommittee indicates that the malnutrition often leads to permanent mental, physical, and
pyschological impairment among migrant children. See 1970 Hearings, pt. 8-A, at 4982-5128.
Disease and mortality rates are extreme among migrant farm workers according to a study
of Texas migrants. Their life expectancy is twenty years below the norm; death from influenza and pneumonia is 200 percent above the average; tuberculosis is 250 percent above
the average. Id. at 4984.
10. See text accompanying notes 24-25 infra.
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Possessing virtually no political impact,"1 the migrant workers have,
more often than not, been both neglected and forgotten by the federal and
state governments. Legislation which has been enacted to aid and protect
other components of the labor force is generally either inapplicable or
ineffective with regard to the migrant farm laborer. Farm labor is usually
excluded from the coverage of state minimum wage statutes'2 and child
labor laws."3 When such laws are applicable to farm workers, the statutes
often set discriminatorily lower standards. 4 Similarly, workmen's compensation is normally unavailable, 5 despite the fact that a higher percentage of accidents occur on farm jobs than in most other occupations.",
11. Due to the ephemeral nature of his visits to each state, the migrant farm worker
seldom complies with the residence requirements for voting in state elections. Similarly,
the migrants seldom are voting constituents of any congressional district. "The obligation
to assure fairness to our migratory workers is particularly compelling because they are
generally barred from voting by residence requirements, and hence can exercise little political
influence on their own behalf." Report on Migratory Labor by the Association of the Bar
of the City of New York, 111 Cong. Rec. 13328, 13330 (1965) (footnote omitted); see
Givens, Legal Disadvantages of Migratory Workers, 16 Lab. L.J. 584, 585 (1965).
12. E.g., N.J. Rev. Stat. § 34:11-34 (1937); N.Y. Labor Law § 651(5) (McKinney Supp.
1970); N.C. Gen. Stat. § 95-86(3) (a) (1965); Ore. Rev. Stat. § 653.020(1) (1969 repL
pt.) (excludes farm piece work); Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 49A6.010(5)(a) (1962).
13. E.g., Fla. Stat. Ann. § 450.081(4) (1966); N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 110-1, 110-6 to -7
(1966); Tex. Pen. Code Ann. art. 1578a (Supp. 1970). Child labor standards are most
appropriate in this area, for studies have shown that "approximately 375,000 children
between the ages of 10 and 13 perform hired farm labor." S. Rep. No. 1006, 90th Cong., 2d
Sess. 34 (1968). It is estimated that one-fourth of the farm labor force is under sixteen
years of age. Id. at 32; N.Y. Times, March 22, 1971, at 19, col 1 (a report on a study by
the American Friends Service Committee). See also L. Shotwell, supra note 5, at 121-23.
14. Agricultural workers covered under the Fair Labor Standards Act are guaranteed
$1.30 an hour (29 U.S.C. § 206(a)(5) (1970)) but are exempt from the law's overtime
provisions. Id. § 213(b)(12); see Sherman, Farmworkers Amendments to the Fair Labor
Standards Act, 5 Clearinghouse Review 207 (1971). The minimum wage laws of Texas
provide that persons performing farm labor should receive an hourly wage $0.20 lower than
the prevailing federal standard; that if housing is provided for the laborer, the minimum
wage should be $30.00 a week; and that if housing is provided for the family of the laborer,
the minimum wage law is inapplicable. Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 5159d, § 6 (1971).
The child labor statutes of several states set lower standards for agricultural labor. See,
e.g., N.J. Rev. Stat. § 34:2-21.15 (Supp. 1967) (must be over 12 years old and cannot work
more than ten hours a day); N.Y. Labor Law § 130(2)(e) (McKinney Supp. 1970),
§§ 170(3), 171(2) (McKinney 1965); Ore. Rev. Stat. § 653.315(2)(a) (1969 repl.
pt.) (excluded from limitation on work before 7 am. or after 6 p.m.).
15. E.g., Fla. Stat. Ann. § 440.02(1)(c)(3) (1966); Kan. Stat. Ann. § 44-SOS (1964);
Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 411.2a (1967); Mo. Rev. Stat. § 287.090(2) (1959); N.C. Gen.
Stat. § 97-13(b) "(1965); Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 8306, § 2 (1967); see Wineberg v.
Department of Lab. & Indus., 57 Wash. 2d 779, 359 P.2d 1046 (1961). Contra, NJ. Rev.
Stat. § 34:15-92 (Supp. 1969). See also Ore. Rev. Stat. § 656.027(5) (1969 repL pt.)
(limited exclusion for small farms).
16. The accident rate among farm workers is three times as great as that of the average
occupational rate. 1970 Hearings, pt. 8-A, at 4984.
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Migrant workers continue in their transient occupation because they
feel they have no reasonable alternative. Most hired agricultural laborers
have little formal education or vocational training and have known no
existence off the farm." Their economic position is so perilous that the
daily necessity of securing food must dictate the terms of their existence.
Furthermore, the migrant is intimidated into staying on the job by either
the "crew boss" or the head of the labor camp, who often threatens to
subject him to imprisonment or police harassment for debts owed.' 8
Broader and more potent legislative programs should be initiated to
uplift the abhorrent housing conditions, improve the educational opportunities, and raise the health and nutritional levels of the migrant. Similarly, the economic disadvantages imposed by discriminatory statutes
should be removed and the right of union representation should be recognized and protected by law. However, even the enactment of such legislation will prove ineffective unless the migrant is educated concerning the
existence of these remedial programs and guarantees and unless government officials can easily provide the enacted benefits to the migrants.
Thus, reasonable access to labor camps and farms on which the migrant
and his family live during the course of their employment is a prerequisite to the success of any program designed to ameliorate the migrant
farm workers' plight.
It should be noted, however, that even if such programs aid the
migrant in raising his socio-economic status to an "acceptable" level, such
progress might only be temporary and, in a sense, illusory. A more basic
dilemma faces the migrant worker due to increased mechanization in har17. See note 8 supra. In discussing the "roots" of the black farm worker of the eastern
seaboard, Miss Shotwell stated: "Overwhelmingly they come straight out of a rural background, with no work experience other than farming in between. Born of sharecropper
parents, they have been tractored out of their livings as sharecroppers, tenants, or day
laborers on farms." L. Shotwell, supra note 5, at 30.
18. Recruitment by the crew boss, leader, or labor contractor involves providing transportation north to participate in the summer and fall harvests. Normally the boss receives
no compensation from the migrant but receives a "head fee" plus a fee from the grower
for each basket or bushel picked by his crew. When faced with a maverick worker who
wishes to abandon the crew (and thus deprive the boss of a portion of his income), the
crew boss often threatens the worker with the debt owed for transportation not yet paid.
See generally L. Shotwell, supra note 5, at 118-19, 225-26; D. Wright, They Harvest Despair
(1965); Coles & Huge, Peonage in Florida, New Republic, July 26, 1969, at 18-19; Levine,
The Migratory Worker in the Farm Economy, 12 Lab. L.J. 622, 624-25 (1961).
A similar threat is used by the owner of the labor camp: "The camps have their own
stores and vendors, and are often guarded by 'camp boys' who walk around with guns.
Migrants are told they cannot leave unless all their debts are paid; the ledgers are tallied
by the men who own and run the camps." Coles & Huge, supra, at 18. See also Comment, Migrant Farm Labor in Upstate New York, 4 Colum. J. L. & Social Problems 1, 2-3 (1968); N.Y.
Times, Aug. 17, 1970, at 1, col. 1 (abuses showing futility of actual resort to police aid).
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vesting techniques.- It is only a matter of time before agribusiness 0 converts from the manual harvesting which the migrant now performs so
cheaply to potentially more economical mechanized methods.2 ' As legislation and labor activities obtain for the migrant a fair wage and improved
conditions (which increase the cost of his labor to the grower), these
achievements will also accelerate the inevitable obsolescence of manual
farm labor.2 '
Although no panacea exists for this complex problem, long-range planning in the areas of job training and education may mitigate the difficulties
caused by the transition from manual to mechanized harvesting. Economic
integration will be a necessity if the migrants' names are not to be added
to the burgeoning list of those made dependent on welfare due to technological displacement. This is not to imply that short-range programs of
alleviation are undesirable or unnecessary. Without significant improvement in the migrant farm workers' conditions, endeavors at job training
and education will most likely prove futile.
This article will deal with one facet of the dilemma facing the migrant:
the problem of ingress and egress to and from the labor camps. The
migrant must be able to mingle freely with the community outside the
farm if he is ever to achieve social and economic independence. Conversely, reasonable ingress is necessary to ensure visitation by those who
19. The small scale farmer no longer adequately represents the farming situation in
America. In the last generation, the average farm has doubled in size, and the value of its
assets has increased tenfold. "Agribusiness" is here. "The top 9 percent of all farms now pay
more than 70 per cent of the total annual farm wage bill....
... The traditional, small family farm has been transformed into a faceless giant whose
financial involvements with other industrial giants form a network of fantastic proportions."
Hearings on S. 8, S. 195, S. 197 & S. 198 Before the Subcomm. on Migratory Labor of the
Senate Comm. on Labor and Public Welfare, 90th Cong., Ist Sess. 141 (1967). See also
Berman & Hightower, Battle for Lettuce: Chavez and the Teamsters, The Nation, Nov. 2,
1970, at 427; Time, The Candor That Refreshes, Aug. 10, 1970, at 59.
The "agrarian myth," so prevalent in the history of American thought, was intellectually
decimated in R. Hofstadter, The Age of Reform 23-59 (1955). The myth continues, however,
even in the face of the growth of agribusiness. Note, Agricultural Labor Relations-The
Other Farm Problem, 14 Stan. L. Rev. 120, 125-26 n.41 (1961). See also Levine, supra
note 18, at 622-23.
20 See Dunne, supra note 2, at 44; Friedman, Migrant Workers, Newsvweek, July 27,
1970, at 60; Levine, supra note 18, at 628-30; Roysher & Ford, California's Grape Pickers
Will Soon Be Obsolete, New Republic, April 13, 1968, at 11. See also Comment, Migrant
Farm Labor in Upstate New York, 4 Colum. J.L. & Social Problems 1, 21 (1968).
21. See authorities cited in note 20 supra. It seems doubtful that in a competitive market
of essentially fungible items the growers would prefer to retain manual harvesting by passing
on any increased costs to the consumer in the form of higher prices rather than maintaining
the price structure as nearly as possible by the implementation of cheaper mechanical
harvesting.
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would attempt to accelerate the migrant's integration and improve his
conditions through government or private aid. An attempt will be made to
briefly describe the particular problem of labor camp access, analyze the
legal rights involved, and examine possible remedies to ensure access to
and from the labor camps in the future.
II. TH, LABOR CAMPS
Either by the terms of his employment or as a result of his social and
financial status, the migrant farm worker and his family normally live
in a labor camp during the harvest. Thousands of these camps,2 2 privately
or publicly owned, exist throughout the nation wherever there is migrant
harvesting. Depending on local custom or on the grower's policy, this
housing is either rented, normally on a weekly basis, or is provided as part
of the compensation-a "fringe benefit"-to the harvesters.2 3
Most of the housing provided is, by contemporary standards, uninhabitable. Each family lives in severely cramped quarters, usually without
24
indoor plumbing or heat and in some instances, without any electricity.
Conditions are less than sanitary; privies are often shared by as many as
twenty-five families.2"
Many of the labor camps, in addition to the pervasive squalor, have a
prison-like atmosphere about them. These "closed camps," composed of
a pathetic cluster of houses, are encircled by barbed wire and numerous
"No Trespassing" signs. 26 These premonitory placards are often supplemented by padlocked gates, limited access dirt roads and, occassionally,
by armed guards.2 ' Frequently all visitors, business or social, are denied
access to the camps without the prior express consent of the management
22. Statistics on the number of migrant camps are not readily available; however, In
New York State alone, where registration is required, 750 camps were registered In 1966.
President's Nat'l Advisory Comm'n on Rural Poverty, Rural Poverty in the United States
452 (1968). Eighty-two percent of these camps are open less than five months a year. Id.
23. See L. Shotwell, supra note 5, at 112-15.
24. See id. at 112-15; Coles & Huge, supra note 18; Compton, This Green Valley Isn't
So jolly, New Republic, Sept. 7, 1968, at 19-20; Time, Aug. 10, 1970, at 59; N.Y. Times,
Aug. 31, 1970, at 32, col. 3; id., Aug. 19, 1970, at 26, col. 5; id., Aug. 8, 1970, at 19, col. 2.
For general housing conditions, see White Paper 22-32.
25. See Compton, supra note
26. See Hearings on S. 8, S.
Labor of the Senate Comm. on
142 (1967); Sherman & Levy,
(1971).
27. See Hearings Before the
and Public Welfare, 91st Cong.,
note 18, at 18.

24.
195, S. 197 & S. 198 Before the Subcomm. on Migratory
Labor and Public Welfare, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, at
Free Access to Migrant Labor Camps, 57 A.BA.J. 434
Subcomm. on Migratory Labor of the Comm. on Labor
1st & 2d Sess., pt. 1, at 192 (1969); Coles & Huge, supra
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or ownership of the particular housing complex. 8 Since the laborers are
often housed far from population centers, the decision to bar visitors from
the camps may result in a virtual elimination of all contact with the outside world. 9 One observer has described such a camp:
This camp is set about 5 miles out of the nearest town. They have barbed wire
around the front of the camp, and also high trees, so that it is really invisible from
the roadside to visitors who pass through. At the front of the gate, they have [an] ...
office [in which] ...[t]he assistant manager stays ...at least 16 hours a day. ....30

The barriers which the prospective visitor encounters with regard to
ingress are paralleled by the difficulties the migrant meets in seeking to
leave the camp. Generally, "the migrant has neither the time, the money
nor the transportation to leave the grower's fields or the confines of the2
residential camp ....',31 Furthermore, the camp commissary system
often adds a further obstacle to egress. The store sells the migrants their
necessities and then often prohibits them from leaving the camp until the
3
debts thus incurred are satisfied
Access to and from the migrant labor camps has, at least until recently, 4 been the subject of few law suits. Neither the possibility of constitutional infirmities in the labor camp system nor the legal relationships
between migrant and grower (or camp owner) arising out of the law of
property have been fully explored or clearly determined. Labor organization may offer a tool to dismember the barriers to access, but the probability of organizational success (outside of the gains already made in
California) is uncertain under current laws. All of these areas are worthy
of further investigation.
The "closed camps" which exist throughout the nation are not, of
course, standardized in the type of restrictions on access which are
utilized. For the purpose of this article, a "closed camp" will be defined
as a labor camp which imposes restrictions of any kind on ingress or egress
to any person whomsoever. This definition encompasses the broadest
spectrum of labor camps, ranging from those camps which enforce total
isolation by means of guards and barbed wire fences to camps with only
28. See Coles & Huge, supra note 18, at 18; Sherman & Levy, supra note 26. See also
Carr, Shame Is Still the Harvest, N.Y. Times, July 12, 1970, § 2, at 15, col. 5.
29. See Sherman & Levy, supra note 26, at 434-35.
30. Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Migratory Labor of the Comm. on Labor and
Public Welfare, 91st Cong., 1st & 2d Sess., pt. 1, at 192 (1969).
31. Sherman & Levy, supra note 26, at 434.
32. The system is widely in use. For example, New York issued over 300 commissary
permits in 1966. President's Nat'l Advisory Comm'n on Rural Poverty, Rural Poverty in
the United States 453 (1968).
33. See Coles & Huge, supra note 18, at 18.
34. See note 116 infra and accompanying text.
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the slightest forms of regulation, such as the necessity of giving notice of
all arrivals and departures. In discussing the legal status of the closed
camps, more exact references to points on this definitional spectrum affected by particular areas of the law will be employed.
III. CONSTITUTIONAL INQUIRIES

The closed camp system may impose upon the migrant farm laborer
(or upon would-be visitors) restrictions which are proper subjects for
scrutiny in light of certain constitutional guarantees and proscriptions. In
this regard, the relevant constitutional provisions are of two types. First,
there are those provisions which enumerate the substantive rights of the
people which are not to be impaired by action of a governmental body,
i.e., by "state action." The provisions of this type which are of primary
significance to the access problems of closed camps include the freedoms
of speech, press, and assembly assured by the first and fourteenth amendments. Second, there are those provisions which absolutely proscribe
certain conduct, regardless of whether it is perpetrated by the state or by
individual persons. Germane to the migrants' problems is the prohibition
of involuntary servitude found in the thirteenth amendment.
A. State Action
That the communicative freedoms embodied in the first amendment and
made applicable to the states by the fourteenth amendment are normally
sacrosanct only against state action is a well settled proposition often
reiterated in the opinions of the Supreme Courte' since its original promulgation in the Civil Rights Cases36 decided in 1883. However, the concept
of state action does not refer merely to those direct actions of the government of a legislative, judicial, or executive nature, but comprehends far
more subtle instances of governmental involvement. Behavior of private
individuals, which was once considered without the scope of constitutional
objection, is no longer exempted from inquiry if commingled with a
significant measure of governmental involvement.
Of course, if the migrant camp is owned and managed by the state or a
political subdivision thereof, then state action is obviously present.8 7
Nevertheless, in those situations where state action is not so blatantly
35. See, e.g., Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296 (1966); Burton v. Wilmington Parking
Auth., 365 U.S. 715 (1961); Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948); Marsh v. Alabama, 326
U.S. 501 (1946).
36. 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
37. See, e.g., Tucker v. Texas, 326 U.S. 517 (1946), where a peddler's conviction for
criminal trespass for refusing to leave a village owned by the United States under a congressional plan to furnish housing to persons engaged in national defense activities was
overturned.
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present, several decisions in the last twenty-five years have raised the
possibility of a finding of state action in the administration of these
camps. Because the rationale and implications of a few of these decisions
are somewhat obscure, it will be necessary to elucidate, if possible, their
meaning.
In 1946 the United States Supreme Court decided Marsh v. Alabama,38
a case involving the proprietary rights of the owners of a "company
town." The town consisted of "residential buildings, streets, a system of
sewers, a sewage disposal plant and a 'business block'... ."'I The Court
further noted that "the town and its shopping district are accessible to
and freely used by the public in general and there is nothing to distinguish
them from any other town and shopping center except the fact that the
title to the property belongs to a private corporation."4 0 However, a sign
was posted which stated: "'This Is Private Property, and Without Written
Permission, No Street, or House Vendor, Agent or Solicitation of Any
Kind Will Be Permitted.' ",41
The case arose out of the criminal trespass conviction of a Jehovah's
Witness who had entered the town and begun distributing religious literature on the sidewalks. The Court observed that had the company town
been a de jure municipality there would have been no doubt but that the
conviction would have to be overturned.42 It had previously been established that "neither a State nor a municipality can completely bar the
distribution of literature containing religious or political ideas on its
streets, sidewalks and public places '43 nor can an "ordinance completely
prohibiting the dissemination of ideas on the city streets ...be justified
on the ground that the municipality holds legal title to them."4 4 The
primary question, then, was posed by the Court as follows: "Can those
people who live in or come to [the company town] be denied freedom
of press and religion simply because a single company has legal title to
all the town?"4 5 The answer was in the negative.
It can be posited that Marsh rests on two independent and alternative
bases rather than a formula representing an integrated whole. One of these
38. 326 U.S. 501 (1946). See generally the analysis in Note, Applicability of the Fourteenth Amendment to Private Organizations, 61 Harv. L. Rev. 344 (1948).
39. 326 U.S. at 502.

40. Id. at 503.
41. Id.
42. See Largent v. Texas, 318 U.S. 418 (1943); Jamison v. Texas, 318 U.S. 413 (1943);
Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147 (1939); Lovel v. City of Griffin, 303 US. 444 (1938). But
see Breard v. Alexandria, 341 U.S. 622 (1951). See also Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496 (1939).
43. 326 U.S. at 504.
44. Id. at 504-05.
45. Id. at 505.
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i.e., weighing the first and
fourteenth amendment rights of the residents against the proprietary
rights of the owner. If such a balancing test is used, without a functional
analysis of the property and the resultant determination of whether or not
the property is utilized as a municipality, the property owner's attempts
to prohibit communication, visitation, or assemblage will always be upheld.
Individuals do not have a right to hold a meeting or offer an oratorical
display or publish upon another's private property absent a finding of
state action in the maintenance of the property. Such state action can be
considered as a buttress against the otherwise unfettered property rights
of the owners.
Similarly, a functional analysis test4 7 alone presents a distorted view
of the intended import of Marsh. It is doubtful that Mr. Justice Black and
the majority were fully equating a de facto town with a de jure municipality, since otherwise the decision would strip the owners of such property of all indicia of proprietary interest save that of bare and impotent
title. Would, for example, the occupancy of the residents be subject to
termination only if a hearing and the other attendant safeguards of due
process were satisfied?4" Would the employees of the town be public
servants or private employees? The answers to these and other similar
questions were probably not intended to be within the scope of the original
pronouncement.
A seemingly more rational formulation of the opinion would be that
both a balancing test and a functional analysis are necessary and that
neither is independently sufficient. The courts seem to impliedly recognize
that the dominion of a property holder over a parcel of land which is used
in a manner which does not significantly affect other individuals is absolute, at least in the sense that he need not allow "outsiders" to assemble
or speak or distribute literature within the boundaries of the parcel. 0 On
alternative bases is the "balancing test,

46. See, e.g., Spriggs, Access of Visitors to Labor Camps on Privately Owned Property,
21 U. Fla. L. Rev. 295, 299-302 (1969).
47. See Berle, Constitutional Limitations On Corporate Activity-Protection of Personal
Rights From Invasion Through Economic Power, 100 U. Pa. L. Rev. 933, 948-49 (1952);
Note, Applicability of the Fourteenth Amendment to Private Organizations, 61 Harv. L.
Rev. 344, 347 (1948).
48. See Escalera v. New York City Housing Auth., 425 F.2d 853 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,

400 U.S. 853 (1970).
49. See State v. Martin, 199 La. 39, 5 So. 2d 377 (1941); Commonwealth v. Richardson,
313 Mass. 632, 48 N.E.2d 678 (1943); Annot., 146 A.L.R. 655 (1943). The use of private
property for commercial purposes may effectuate a shift in the balance from property rights
to first
amendment rights; however, the sit-in opinions, such as Bell v. Maryland, 378 U.S.
226 (1964), did not directly face the problem. See also Robinson v. Florida, 378 U.S. 153
(1964); Paulsen, The Sit-In Cases of 1964: "But Answer Came There None," 1964 Sup. Ct.
Rev. 137.
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the other hand, the dominion over property which constitutes a town or
municipality, the functioning of which affects the lives of individuals other
than the owner, is not always absolute, and the owner must reflect in his
management-in effect, a substitute for municipal government and thus
a form of state action-the rights guaranteed by the Constitution. The
degree to which these constitutional rights are exercisable by the town's
residents is determined by balancing their rights against the property rights
of the owner of the town, which still remains private property although it
performs a municipal function. Once a determination of state action has
been made, if property rights conflict with first amendment rights, the
resolution must be made in favor of the latter because of their nature as
"preferred rights."50 More succinctly, when a company town functions
like any other town, the first amendment rights of individuals are secure
against infringement by the management of the town.
The application of Marsh to the restrictions on access prevalent in
many migrant labor camps is not inconsequential. Many of these camps
are quite similar, if not identical, in their basic structure to the company
town in Marsh.51 A caveat is in order, however, for the more restrictive
the conditions of the camp with respect to access the less likely it is that
the Marsh holding will be applicable. The rationale of imparting upon
the company town or migrant labor camp a degree of state action
is grounded in its public function aspect. "Ownership does not always mean absolute dominion. The more an owner, for his advantage,
opens up his property for use by the public in general, the more do his
rights become circumscribed by the statutory and constitutional rights
of those who use it."52 The migrant labor camp must prossess a sufficient
amount of "publicness" to fall within the rule postulated by the Court.
A more recent case decided by the Supreme Court, Amalgamated Food
Employees Local 590 v. Logan Valley Plaza, Inc.," indicates that the
degree of "publicness" necessary to a finding of public function, and thus
of state action, need not be so great as to constitute a de facto municipality. In holding the injunction of peaceful picketing in a shopping center
50. For a discussion of the preferred status given the rights guarantee by the first amendment, see McKay, The Preference for Freedom, 34 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 1182 (1959).
51. See text accompanying notes 38-41 supra.
52. Marsh v. Alabama, 326 US. 501, 506 (1946). The requisite of "openness" has been
criticized as unnecessary to the holding in Marsh. Note, Privileged Entry Onto Farm Property For Union Organizers, 19 Hastings L.. 413, 416, 419 (1968).
53. For example, the first amendment guarantees do not require that entry be permitted
into the inner hallways of private apartment buildings. Watchtower Bible & Tract Soc'y, Inc.
v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 297 N.Y. 339, 79 N.E.2d 433, cert. denied, 335 US. 886
(1948), noted in 48 Colum. L. Rev. 1105 (1948).
54. 391 US. 308 (1968).
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to be an unconstitutional deprivation of first amendment rights, the Court
stated that because of the free accessibility of the center to the public,
the State may not delegate the power, through the use of its trespass laws, 'wholly to
exclude those members of the public wishing to exercise their First Amendment rights
on the premises in a manner and for a purpose generally consonant with the use to
which the property is actually put. 5 5

In a recent district court case, Folgueras v. Hassle,"0 the restrictions
imposed upon access to several migrant farm labor camps" were declared
unconstitutional. The opinion, although generally claiming to be merely
following such earlier decisions as Marsh and Amalgamated Food Employees, may have indicated an expansion of the rationales espoused in
those cases. Although the court spoke of the need for state action, 8
nowhere in the opinion is it clearly stated whether that degree of openness
was present which was considered essential to the findings of state action
in Marsh and Amalgamated Food Employees."0
The opinion seems to base its finding of state action on the nature of the
camps as de facto towns irrespective of the element of openness to those
outside the camps."0 This aspect of the opinion, if widely followed, would
represent an end to the publicness test, replacing it with a more simplistic
test of function.
The case of Shelley v. Kraemer,61 decided in 1948, has engendered a
voluminous amount of comment. 62 In that case the United States Supreme
55. Id. at 319-20 (footnote omitted). The converse is equally true. That is, even when
property is publicly owned, "where property is not ordinarily open to the public, this Court
has held that access to it for the purpose of exercising First Amendment rights may be denied altogether." Id. at 320; see Adderley v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39 (1966).
56. 331 F. Supp. 615 (W.D. Mich. 1971). The other aspects of this case are discussed in notes 129-33 infra and accompanying text.
57. Involved were fifteen camps in Western Michigan with approximately 220 dwelling
units, 12 feet by 12 feet in dimension. Id. at 616-17.
58. Id. at 621.
59. The opinion recognizes the dissimilarities between the company town in Marsh and
the shopping center in Amalgamated Food Employees, on the one hand, and the migrant
camps there involved on the other. Id. at 623.
60. This proposition was originally put forth in the concurring opinion of Mr. Justice
Frankfurter in Marsh. 326 U.S. at 510-11 (concurring opinion). The extension of the Marsh
rationale beyond the "openness" or "publicness" test was recently denied in State v. Shack,
58 N.J. 297, 277 A.2d 369 (1971).
61. 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
62. See, e.g., discussions of Shelley in Henkin, Shelley v. Kraemer: Notes for a Revised
Opinion, 110 U. Pa. L. Rev. 473 (1962); Horowitz, The Misleading Search for "State
Action" Under the Fourteenth Amendment, 30 S. Cal. L. Rev. 208 (1957); Lewis, The
Meaning of State Action, 60 Colum. L. Rev. 1083 (1960); Wechsler, Toward Neutral
Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 Harv. L. Rev. 1 (1959); Note, State Action Reconsidered in the Light of Shelley v. Kraemer, 48 Colum. L. Rev. 1241 (1948); 10 U.C.L.A.L.
Rev. 401 (1963).

19711

ACCESS TO LABOR CAMPS

Court found state action to exist when restrictive agreements forbidding
conveyances of certain real estate to non-Caucasians were enforced in the
state courts. The Court noted that judicial enforcement of what was
otherwise a private activity was a sufficient involvement of governmental
powers to constitute state action.' However, certain limitations on this
doctrine were implicit in the Court's treatment; the decisive factor in
finding state action was that, but for the judicial enforcement, the victims
of the restrictive covenants would have occupied the premises."
Unfortunately, the doctrine enunciated in Shelley will seldom aid those
seeking access to migrant camps. It is not necessary for camp owners or
management to employ state courts to keep visitors away-fences and
guards are normally sufficient." When enforcement may be legitimately
carried out without judicial aid, no state action can be found under the
rule of Shelley.
Likewise, there is normally lacking in migrant farm labor camps that
degree of governmental regulation necessary to invoke a claim of state
action. Since Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority"0 was decided, a
plethora of claims have attempted to show that a state had "insinuated"
itself into a private function to such a degree that it was susceptible of
constitutional regulation. 7 Courts have found, under certain conditions,
that individuals have been denied their constitutional rights by the acts
of private hospitals"8 and colleges69 which amount to state action when
state involvement through regulation and control was present. However,
the crucial finding requires that
the state must be involved not simply with some activity of the institution alleged
63. 334 U.S. at 20.
64. "These are not cases, as has been suggested, in which the States have merely abstained
from action, leaving private individuals free to impose such discriminations as they see
fit.... The difference between judicial enforcement and nonenforcement of the restrictive
covenants is the difference to petitioners between being denied rights of property available
to other members of the community and being accorded full enjoyment of those rights on
an equal footing." Id. at 19.
65. But see Folgueras v. Hassle, 331 F. Supp. 615, 617 (W.D. Mich. 1971), where
defendant's use of force to keep trespassers off his property did not vitiate the court's
finding of sufficient "openness" and, thus, state action under the Marsh rationale.
66. 365 U.S. 715 (1961).
67. 39 Fordham L. Rev. 127, 130 (1970).
68. E.g., Sams v. Ohio Valley Gen. Hasp. Ass'n, 413 F.2d 826 (4th Cir. 1969); Foster
v. Mobile County Hosp. Bd., 398 F.2d 227 (5th Cir. 1968); Simkins v. Moses H. Cone
Memorial Hosp., 323 F.2d 959 (4th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 376 U.S. 938 (1964), noted in
62 Mich. L. Rev. 1433 (1964). Contra, Mulvihill v. Julia L. Butterfield Memorial Hosp.,
329 F. Supp. 1020 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
69. E.g., Powe v. Miles, 407 F.2d 73 (2d Cir. 1968). See also Coleman v. Wagner College, 429 F.2d 1120 (2d Cir. 1970), noted in 39 Fordham L. Rev. 127 (1970). But cf.
Grossner v. Trustees of Columbia Univ., 287 F. Supp. 535 (S.D-N.Y. 1968).
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to have inflicted injury upon a plaintiff but with the activity that caused the injury.
Putting the point another way, the state action, not the private action, must be the
70
subject of the complaint.

Indeed, there is often state regulation of many facets of migrant camp
life." However, the imposition of health standards or a registration requirement cannot be the basis for a charge of state action when the camp
owner refuses to allow visitors or permit the farm laborers to leave.
It would then seem that attacks on migrant labor camp restrictions on
access will rarely succeed on the basis of a fourteenth amendment claim
unless the camp is owned by either a state or political subdivision thereof.
However, should it be established that the camp has always displayed
a sufficient degree of openness and that one visitor or a class of visitors
has been denied entry, then the doctrine of Marsh may be applied. 2
In most other instances, attempts at finding state action will prove to be
a tenuous approach.
It should be noted that theories have been propounded which would
totally eliminate the need for a finding of state action before an individual
can successfully claim that there has been an unlawful interference with
his constitutional rights. In 1883, in the Civil Rights Cases,7 Mr. Justice
Harlan in his forceful dissent argued that the first sentence of the first
section of the fourteenth amendment created a dual citizenship for all,
irrespective of the intended scope of that section's second sentence. 4 If
our first amendment communicative rights are guaranteed as an incident
of federal citizenship, it can be argued that such civil rights cannot be
violated regardless of who the perpetrator is or whether or not state action
is involved.
The original Bill of Rights was added to the Constitution because of the
general fear that power is often abused at the expense of the citizenry.
In the late 1700's only governments possessed the quantum of power
required to impose significant artificial restraints and restrictions on the
freedom of the individual. Today that power is possessed by many
ccsemiautonomous economic organizations."7 Accordingly, it has been
70. Powe v. Miles, 407 F.2d 73, 81 (2d Cir. 1968). See also Mulvihill v. Julia L. Butterfield Memorial Hosp., 329 F. Supp. 1020 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
71. For example, Florida regulates safety conditions to some extent (Fla. Stat. Ann.
§§ 381.422-.502 (1959)), sanitary conditions (id. §§ 509.012-.302), and construction
standards. Id. §§ 421.01-.54.
72. Cf. text accompanying notes 56-60 supra.
73. 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
74. Id. at 26-62 (dissenting opinion).
75. Miller, The Constitutional Law of the "Security States," 10 Stan. L. Rev. 620, 625
(1958). The rise of the "corporate state" has given rise to strong and spreading criticism of
the economic and technocratic controls placed on the individal's choice of action. See generally T. Roszak, The Making of a Counter Culture (1969).
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stated that the spirit of the first ten amendments can continue to exist
meaningfully only if all organizations which have the power to significantly control the conduct of individuals are subordinated to the individual's constitutional guarantees.-I Such an approach, although appealing,
does not appear likely to achieve success in the courtroom since it would
represent a large upheaval in prevalent concepts of jurisprudence.
B. The Thirteenth Amendment
In those situations in which no state action can be discerned, even under
the more expansive theories and definitions of that term, the closed
migrant labor camp may still be subject to constitutional scrutiny through
which possible violations of the thirteenth amendment's prohibition
against involuntary servitude may be detected.Y The prohibitory language of that amendment, unlike that of the fourteenth, is absolute and
is not restricted in its dictates to a specified type of transgressor; it is
directed not only at political subdivisions but also at individuals.' s That
this proposition, seemingly self-evident from the language of the amendment, is correct was strikingly observed in the Civil Rights Cases,'" the
very decision which announced the doctrine of state action in cases arising
out of the fourteenth amendment.
The thirteenth amendment may appear to many to be of only historical
significance-the culmination of and natural sequel to Lincoln's Emancipation Proclamation-and thus totally devoid of any continuing legal
import subsequent to the elimination of the institution of chattel slavery.
Recently, however, certain forms of twentieth century discrimination
have been successfully attacked as incidents or badges of slavery."
76. Miller, supra note 75, at 661-66; see Berle, supra note 47. But see Wellington, The
Constitution, The Labor Union, and "Governmental Action," 70 Yale L.J. 345, 374 (1961).
77. "Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for crime whereof
the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist within the United States, or any place
subject to their jurisdiction." U.S. Const. amend. XIII, § 1.
For a discussion of the congressional debates which flourished over the passage of the
amendment, see tenBroek, Thirteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States,
39 Calif. L. Rev. 171 (1951).
78. Clyatt v. United States, 197 U.S. 207, 216 (1905); see tenEroek, supra note 77, at
172. See also United States v. Gaskin, 320 U.S. 527 (1944); Railroad Tax Cases, 13 F. 722,
740 (C.C.D. Cal. 1882), appeal dismissed, 116 US. 138 (1885).

79.
80.
Rev.
with

109 U.S. 3, 20 (1883).
See, e.g., Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 US. 409 (1968), noted in 37 Fordham L.
277 (1968). Compare the language of Bailey v. Alabama, 219 U.S. 219, 241 (1911),
the earlier decision in Hodges v. United States, 203 U.S. 1, 17 (1906) (refuting the

contention that thd amendment impliedly guarantees the right to contract, buy and sell land,
etc.). The argument has been made that the amendment insures "the equal right of all to
enjoy protection in those natural rights which constitute that freedom." tenBroek, supra
note 77, at 203. See also -Note, The Reach of the Thirteenth Amendment, 47 Colum. L.
Rev. 299 (1947).
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Furthermore, the amendment explicitly forbids not only slavery, but
"involuntary servitude" as well. The latter is a nebulous term and consequently the cases have been unsuccessful in defining it with any degree
82
of clarity."' It is certain, however, that peonage is within its ambit.
In an attempt to effectuate the purposes of the amendment, Congress
has enacted legislation designed to eradicate the practices of peonage and
involuntary servitude. Section 1581 of Title 18 of the United States Code
makes it a criminal act for anyone to hold a person in peonage. 83 Peonage
has been described as "a status or condition of compulsory service or involuntary servitude based upon a real or alleged indebtedness. ' 84 Thus,
"[i]t is sufficient to constitute [peonage] that a person is held against
his will and made to work to pay a debt." ' The amount of the debt and
the means of coercion are immaterial. Threats of prosecution may constitute sufficient coercion to establish peonage.8 16 Furthermore, in conclud81. See United States v. Shackney, 333 F.2d 475 (2d Cir. 1964). See generally Shapiro,
Involuntary Servitude: The Need for a More Flexible Approach, 19 Rutgers L. Rev. 65
(1964).
82. E.g., Taylor v. Georgia, 315 U.S. 25 (1942); Pierce v. United States, 146 F.2d 84
(5th Cir. 1944), cert. denied, 324 U.S. 873 (1945); Peonage Cases, 123 F. 671 (M.D. Ala.

1903). See also United States v. Reynolds, 235 U.S. 133 (1914); In re Peonage Charge, 138
F. 686 (C.C.N.D. Fla. 1905).
83. "Whoever holds or returns any person to a condition of peonage, or arrests any
person with the intent of placing him in or returning him to a condition of peonage, shall
be fined not more than $5,000 or imprisoned not more than five years, or both." 18 U.S.C.
§ 1581(a) (1970).
The basic statute implementing the peonage prohibition of the thirteenth amendment is
42 U.S.C. § 1994 (1970): "The holding of any person to service or labor under the system
known as peonage is abolished and forever prohibited

....

"

See also 18 U.S.C.

§

1584

(1970).
84. Pierce v. United States, 146 F.2d 84, 86 (5th Cir. 1944), cert. denied, 324 U.S. 873
(1945); see United States v. Reynolds, 235 U.S. 133 (1914); Peonage Cases, 123 F. 671
(M.D. Ala. 1903). The following description of peonage, based on the Peonage Cases, Is
offered by Professor Shapiro:
"The peon was not a slave in the pre-Thirteenth Amendment meaning, but was legally a
freeman, with political as well as civil rights. He entered into the bondage relation from
some choice, for a definite period, as the result of a mutual contract. The peon agreed
with the master on the nature of the service, its duration, and the amount of compensation. It was an inequitable relationship brought about by a socio-economic condition, somewhat akin to European serfdom, in which contractual self-abasement might be entered Into
for a variety of reasons. In actual practice, from the moment of entering the relationship
the 'political' and 'civil' rights were illusory." Shapiro, supra note 81, at 75 (footnote
omitted).
85. Bernal v. United States, 241 F. 339, 342 (Sth Cir. 1917), cert. denied, 245 U.S. 672
(1918). See also Pierce v. United States, 146 F.2d 84, 86 (5th Cir. 1944), cert. denied, 324
U.S. 873 (1945).
86. United States v. Clement, 171 F. 974, 976 (D.S.C. 1909).
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ing whether coercion was present, the relationship between the parties
must be examined to determine whether the threats overcame the will of
the servant or whether the service was voluntary.87
When the migrant farm laborer is coerced into remaining with a crew
leader or on a migrant farm labor camp because of threats of prosecution
for debts owed the crew leader or camp owner, the statutory and constitutional bar against peonage is clearly applicable. Pollock v. Williams,"
discussed peonage in lumber camps under circumstances strikingly similar
to the conditions in migrant farm labor camps detailed earlier in this
article.89 Although it is true that only in the most confining of camps are
conditions likely to be found which would constitute peonage, it is also
highly probable that these camps would be among the camps not sufficiently "open" to fall within the Marsh doctrine.
IV.

THE GROWER'S PROPERTY RIGHTS AND DUTIES

The law has often characterized a field hand as a mere servant who receives his housing as a gratuity from his "master" and who therefore has
no standing to question the restrictions imposed upon the "gift." This
obsolete view of the farm workers' servility has greatly influenced a
perpetuation of the disregard for the barriers surrounding the rights to
access imposed upon those who live in agricultural labor camps. Of the
three categories in which the worker might be classified--servant, licensee,
or tenant-the designation of "servant" carries with it the least amount
of protection for the worker and allows the greatest amount of arbitrary
action by the grower. The role of the licensee is slightly better. It appears,
however, that in most instances the labor camp inhabitant is not a mere
licensee or servant, but rather a tenant. For example, in Tucker v. Park
Yarn Mill Co. the court drew a similar distinction between a servant and
an employee-tenant:
Nor can the further contention of plaintiff that the relationship between the parties to
this action, while plaintiff was occupying house, was that of master and servant, or
employer and employee, and not that of landlord and tenant, be sustained. While
plaintiff was in defendant's mill, engaged in ... her duties as its employee, the relation
between them was that of employer and employee, but while she was in the house
[which her employer furnished for employees and for which sixty cents a week rent
was deducted from her wages], occupying it as her home, defendant was her landlord
and she was its tenant. It cannot be held that plaintiff, while in the house furnished
87. Id. See also United States v. Ancarola, 1 F. 676 (C.C.S).N.Y. 1880).

88. 322 U.. 4 (1944).
89. Compare id. at 18-19, 19 n.30 & 20 n.32, with text accompanying notes 22-33 supra.
90. 194 N.C. 756, 140 S.E. 744 (1927).
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her by defendant, to be occupied by her as her home, was in a place furnished by her
employer for the performance of her duties as an employee. The house was not
furnished her as a place in which to work. When she entered this house she was in her
home. There she was under no duty to defendant as its employee, nor did defendant
owe her any duty, while she was in the house, as her employer. Its duties to her,

while in the house, arose solely from the relationship of landlord and tenant.

1

The designation of the farm worker as tenant can similarly be founded
on the distinct separation between work performed and place of habitation. The farmer may wish to have his labor force near at hand and, for
that reason, may specifically describe available housing in the employment
contract if one is entered into. However, the work and the housing are
usually only related as a matter of convenience to either the farmer or
the worker, and not by any actual dependency of one on the other. The
field worker could pick the fruit no matter where he lived as long as le
was within a distance reasonable for commuting. It is not necessary to live
in the camps to do the job efficiently and completely. This is illustrated by
the fact that many farms which have labor camps also draw on the dayhaul worker from nearby communities to supplement their labor force.02
Since the camp inhabitants and the day workers pick the same fields in the
same manner, the distinction between work and housing is clear.
Some labor camps obviously come closer to traditional notions of tenancy than do others. A camp laid out on a single or double family dwelling
plan is more suggestive of tenancy than a barracks full of single men's
double bunks and lockers. Camps where food is served in a mess hall by
the management are less likely to create a tenancy than are camps where
meals are prepared individually for the family unit. The presence of a
man's family indicates the presence of his "home" and the existence of
nonworking members of the family in a labor camp is another example
of how little the house and field work are related. The determining factor
in a finding of a lease often is the worker's payment of rent for his housing. 3 "Rent" is used in the broad sense and means whatever return
accrues to the owner for the use and occupation of his realty.
91. Id. at 759, 140 S.E. at 745.
92. "For years the seasonal farm labor needs of growers in many localities have been
served by a 'commuter' program, popularly referred to as the 'day haul.'" U.S. Bureau of
Labor Standards, Dep't of Labor, Bull. No. 245, The Day Haul Program, Commuting to
Farm Jobs vii (1962).
93. Angel v. Black Band Consol. Coal Co., 96 W. Va. 47, 122 S.E. 274 (1924). Contra,
Davis v. Long, 45 N.D. 581, 178 N.W. 936 (1920). Davis held that although payment of
rent was a strong factor leading to the finding of a lease, other circumstances, such as the
necessity of the employee's living on the premises to perform the work, would negate the
presumption favoring the lessor-lessee relationship. In Folgueras v. Hassle, 331 F. Supp. 615
(W.D. Mich. 1971), the court found the essential elements to be that "[t]he migrant
pays for the dwelling he occupies; the landlord binds himself to provide a dwelling of
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Once the farm worker is viewed as a tenant, his position is immediately
enhanced." His ability to entertain visitors is no longer a privilege to be
granted or denied at the whim of management, but is preserved in the
face of all but the most reasonable regulations on the part of the camp
owners. It has been found by some courts that the implied license granted
to a tenant with respect to access to the premises includes the right to
have third party visitors, even against the strenuous objections and
physical obstruction of the landlord."
It is settled that, when a landlord lets property to be occupied by several tenants,
although he retains for certain purposes control of the common doorways, passageways, stairways and the like, he grants to his tenants a right of way in the nature of
an easement, appurtenant to the premises let, through those places that afford access
thereto. . . .It is also settled that this easement extends to the members of the

tenant's family and to all his guests and invitees. 90

Closely analagous to the labor camp situation is the factual context of
Davies v. Kelley. 7 The premises were leased to multiple tenants, each of
whom occupied a different portion. All tenants used certain parts of the
building in common. Those generally used sections of the premises were not
included in the tenant's lease, and thus the landlord was presumed to have
retained control over such areas." In order for a tenant to gain access to
his particular demised portion of the tenancy, it is oftentimes necessary to
utilize the streets, stairs, passageways, and other common areas. In Davies
it was held that a right to use such portions for the beneficial enjoyment
of the part demised arises in favor of each tenant and his invitees.0
Stripped of the excessive categorization of relationships between the
owner and those present on his property, ownership is, in effect, merely
a concept indicative of a collection of intangible rights which society has
determined to be permissible for the owner to exercise. It has long been
stated that property rights are not absolute and are subservient to the
a fixed quality; the migrant occupies the dwelling exclusive of the landlord for an

agreed upon term-the length of his employment." Id. at 624.
94. There is no case law successfully preventing an express invitee of a tenant from
visiting, even when the only access is across the landlord's property. However, there is
support for the proposition that a man cannot be a trespasser if he is invited by the occupant, either expressly or by implication. Eg., Flynn v. Chippewa County, 244 Wis. 455, 12
N.W.2d 683 (1944); Grossenbach v. Devonshire Realty Co, 218 Wis. 633, 261 N.W. 742
(1935).
95. E.g., Commonwealth v. Richardson, 313 Mass. 632, 48 N.E.2d 678 (1943); Montgomery v. Commonwealth, 99 Va. 833, 37 S.E. 841 (1901).
96. Commonwealth v. Richardson, 313 Mass. 632, 639, 48 N.E.2d 678, 682 (1943).
97. 112 Ohio St. 122, 146 N.E. 888 (1925).
98. See Note, Landlord's Retention of Power to Control Premises, 15 CIev.-Mar. L. Rev.
579, 583 (1966).
99. 112 Ohio St. at 127, 146 N.E. at 890.
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greater good of society. 0 ' Recently, the recognition of the non-absolute
nature of property rights has been even more vociferously advocated. 10'
Applying this more modern view of the rights which accompany title to a
piece of land to the migrants' situation, it is clear that the right to control
access to and from the migrants' camp to their detriment should not be
a right which runs with the land.
V.

LABOR

Attempts at eliminating the bars to access through the unionization of
migrant farm workers present certain problems. Although it seems certain
that unionization of the migrants would succeed in removing the barriers
surrounding accessibility to the camps, the more "closed" the camp, the
less likely are the chances of forming the migrants into a strong unit capable of effective collective bargaining. Without open lines of communication to the migrant farm worker, attempts at unionization seem doomed
from their inception.
The benefits of coverage by the National Labor Relations Act, which
includes protection of organizational efforts 10 2 even on private property,''
are denied to the agricultural worker.' The exclusion stems from hostility which arose out of organizational efforts in the 1930's'06 and the
efforts of the powerful farm lobby. 1' The exclusion does not, of course,
indicate an intent to make farm unions illegal."'
Another significant factor which hinders efforts at unionization is a lack
100. See 5 R. Powell, Real Property U 745, at 493-94 (P. Rohan ed. 1970). See also
H. Broom, Legal Maxims 238 (10th ed. 1939).
101. See, e.g., Cross, The Diminishing Fee, 20 Law & Contemp. Prob. 517 (1955); Powell,
The Relationship Between Property Rights and Civil Rights, 15 Hastings L.J. 135 (1963).
See also Folgueras v. Hassle, 331 F. Supp. 615 (W.D. Mich. 1971); State v. Shack, 58
N.J. 297, 277 A.2d 369 (1971).
102. Section 8(a) of the National Labor Relations Act enumerates acts of interference
with the right of self-organization among the prohibited "unfair labor practices." 29 U.S.C.
§ 158(a) (1970).
103. E.g., NLRB v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 351 U.S. 105 (1956); NLRB v. S & H
Grossinger's Inc., 372 F.2d 26 (2d Cir. 1967).
104. National Labor Relations Act § 2(3), 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (1970). For an interpretation of the perimeters of the term "agricultural worker," see Di Giorgio Fruit Corp. v.
NLRB, 191 F.2d 642 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 869 (1951); Bodine Produce Co.,
147 N.L.R.B. 832 (1964). See also Lucas County Farm Bureau Coop. Ass'n v. NLRB, 289
F.2d 844 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 823 (1961).
105. C. McWilliams, Factories in the Field 211-63 (1939).
106. See Note, The Constitutionality of the NLRA Farm Labor Exemption, 19 Hastings
L.J. 384, 384-86 (1968).
107. Madden, Origin and Early Years of the National Labor Relations Act, 18 Hastings
L.J. 571, 583 (1967). See also Rummel, Current Developments in Farm Labor Law, 19
Hastings L.J. 371 (1968).
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of identity among farm workers with regard to their roles as such. Most
migrant farm workers feel that their present employment is merely a way
station to a more lucrative occupation.10 8 The resultant absence of a
rural proletariat impedes progress in both the labor and political spheres.
Recent advances in union organization have, however, been made in
California. The successes achieved by Cesar Chavez, the leader of the
United Farm Workers Organizing Committee (UFWOC),'09 in bringing
growers to the bargaining table are unparalleled in any other area where
migrant farm workers are utilized in harvesting. By the end of the
summer of 1970, the great majority of the table grape growers, 110 as well
as many of the lettuce, nut, and citrus growers,"' had signed union contracts.
The success of the UFWOC can be attributed to many factors. One of
the most important was the choice of consumer picketing as the priority
tactic." 2 Public backing for Chavez's efforts, especially on the pesticide
issue, came from such diverse sources as church groups and older leaders
of organized labor and contributed to the possibility of success.

13

How-

108. Note, Agricultural Labor Relations-The Other Farm Problem, 14 Stan. L. Rev.
120, 128 (1961). Ironically, the feeling of impermanence shared by many migrants may be
well founded, not because of opportunities upward, but due to technological displacement.
See notes 20 & 21 supra and accompanying text.
109. Between 1959 and 1961 the AFL-CIO operated a pilot program to organize migrant
farm workers in California. Daniel, Problems of Union Organization for Migratory Workers,
12 Lab. L.J. 636, 641-42 (1961). The National Farm Workers Association, founded by
Chavez in 1965, merged with the Agricultural Workers Organizing Committee, the AFLCIO affiliate, to form UFWOC. Taylor, supra note 3, at 167.
110. For a chronological history of UFWOC's successes, see N.Y. Times, April 2, 1970,
at 29, col. 2; id., May 31, 1970, § 1, at 56, col. 4; id., June 30, 1970, at 34, col. 2; id.,
July 30, 1970, at 1, col. 5. See also authorities cited in note 2 supra.
111. See N.Y. Times, June 11, 1970, at 42, col. 6; id., June 8, 1970, at 27, col. 1.
112. See Taylor, supra note 3. See also Interview with Cesar Chavez in Fitch, Tilting
with the System, The Christian Century, Feb. 18, 1970, at 204; Taylor, Why Chavez Spurns
the Labor Act, The Nation, April 12, 1971, at 454-56. Farmers and growers have felt that an
NLRA inclusion for farm unions would deprive the unions of the secondary boycott and
thus weaken the bargaining position of Chavez and UFWOC. Id. at 454-55. Chavez has
lately shown reluctance to such an inclusion. Fitch, supra, at 204. Whether an exempt union
can commit an unfair labor practice within the meaning of section 8(b)(4) of the Act
(29 U.S.C. § 158(b) (4) (1970)) by conducting a secondary boycott is not settled. See
Di Giorgio Fruit Corp. v. NLRB, 191 F.2d 642, 646 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 342 US.
869 (1951). But see Local 833, UAW, 116 N.L.R.B. 267, 278 (1956). However,
"[w]hen consumer picketing is employed only to persuade customers not to buy the struck
product, the union's appeal is closely confined to the primary dispute," and thus is not
prohibited. NLRB v. Fruit Packers, Local 760, 377 U.. 58, 72 (1964).
113. See Taylor, supra note 3. The issue of pesticide use was even included in the first
collective bargaining contract signed by a grower in the table grape industry. N.Y. Times,
April 2, 1970, at 29, col. 2.
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ever, the situation appears to be atypical. The essential factor of outside
aid could not, in itself, guarantee success. The migrant farm workers in
California are, for the most part, Chicanos. The racial and ethnic
solidarity which Chavez, a quiet but persistent leader, was able to utilize
as a replacement for an identity as a particular laboring class"' is not
as predominant in other harvesting areas. Furthermore, the use of closed
camps does not appear to be as prevalent in California, where many of
the migrants form more permanent bases and the range of migration is
somewhat shorter.11 5
VI. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
In the past couple of years, activity designed to eliminate the barriers
to access to and from the migrant labor camps has increased tremendously. Numerous lawsuits, praying for guaranteed access and other benefits to the migrants, have been filed." 0 Several decisions have strengthened
the migrants' legal rights along with the position of those who attempt to
communicate with them.
One of the most notable of the recent cases is State v. Shack,"1 decided
by the Supreme Court of New Jersey. Two representatives of organizations which provide services for migrant farm workers"1 8 entered upon
the property of a grower in order to assist two migrant farm workers with
their medical and legal problems. The grower stated that all consultations
must take place under his supervision and in his presence. These conditions were unacceptable to the visitors who then refused to leave. Upon
written complaint of the farmer, the defendants were arrested and subsequently convicted of criminal trespass.
Several contentions were presented to the New Jersey Supreme Court
upon an appeal brought to overturn the convictions. Numerous constitutional arguments were advanced by the defendants and rejected by the
court." 9 In particular, much reliance was placed on the rationale of
114. See Dunne, supra note 2. See also Fitch, supra note 112.
115. See Levine, supra note 18, at 626-27.
116. See, e.g., Peper v. Cedarbrook Farms, Inc., No. 19,075 (3d Cir., filed Oct. 22, 1970);
Flores v. Joan of Arc Co., No. 70-C-3065 (N.D. Ill., filed Dec. 9, 1970); California Rural
Legal Assistance v. Zanger, No. C-70-2236 (N.D. Cal., filed Oct. 14, 1970); Olguln v.
Fresh Pict Foods, Inc., No. C-2485 (D. Colo., filed Aug. 10, 1970).
117. 58 NJ. 297, 277 A.2d 369 (1971).

118. One defendant was a field worker for the Farm Workers Division of the South.
west Citizens Organization for Poverty Elimination (SCOPE),

an organization which

provides health services for migrant farm workers. The other defendant was a staff attorney with the Farm Workers Division of Camden Regional Legal Services. Both organiza.

tions are nonprofit corporations funded by the Office of Economic Opportunity. Id. at 298,
277 A.2d at 370.
119. Id. at 301-02, 277 A.2d at 371.
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Marsh to the effect that the first amendment rights of the defendants and
of the migrants were offended by the action of the farmer which was, in
effect, state action. In rejecting this approach, the court stated:
Those cases rest upon the fact that the property was in fact bpened to the general
public. There may be some migrant camps with the attributes of the company town in
Marsh and of course they would come within its holding. But there is nothing of that
character in the case before us, and hence2 0there would have to be an extension of
Marsh to embrace the immediate situation.'

The court reversed the convictions, however, on the ground that "under
our State law the ownership of real property does not include the right
to bar access to governmental services available to migrant workers
. . .. M21 Noting that the decision in these terms was more expansive, the
court stated unequivocally that property rights are not absolute but must
"serve human values.... Title to real property cannot include dominion
over the destiny of persons the owner permits to come upon the premM

ises. 22
Furthermore, the court refused to approach the determination of the
migrants' rights in the context of archaic classifications of relationships
between the property owner and those upon his land. Instead, the court
stated that "[t]he quest is for a fair adjustment of the competing needs
of the parties, in light of the realities of the relationship between the
migrant worker and the operator of the housing facility."'2
In summary, the court stated: "[W]e find it unthinkable that the
farmer-employer can assert a right to isolate the migrant worker in any
respect significant for the worker's well-being."'2 4 Accordingly, the following people must be allowed access to the migrants:
(1) all representatives of government and recognized charitable agencies seeking to aid the migrant;
(2) all visitors of the migrant's choice;
(3) all members of the press, so long as there is no objection from the
migrants; and
(4) peddlers whose exclusion would deprive the migrants of access to
necessary items (other solicitors and peddlers may be denied entrance unless the grower's purpose is to gain a "commercial advantage") .125
When property rights are construed as in Shack, the Marsh rationale
120. Id. at 301, 277 A.2d at 371.
121. Id. at 302, 277 A.2d at 371-72.
122.

Id. at 303, 277 A.2d at 372. See note 101 supra and accompanying text.

123. 58 N.J. at 307, 277 A.2d at 374.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 307-08, 277 A.2d at 374.
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diminishes in importance. A recent case in New York, People v. Rewald,120
did, however, find that the attributes of the labor camp were extremely
similar to the company town in Marsh. The camp had a grocery store,
a church, a barber shop, public telephones, recreational facilities, and
many other indicia of a de facto town. Many of the migrants had cars and
shopped in neighboring communities. However, the owner did exercise a
discriminatory control over visitors.12 7 The defendant, a newspaper reporter, was arrested for criminal trespass upon refusing to leave the
premises. Although discussing at length the similarities to Marsh, the court
did not explicitly hold that state action was present nor that constitutional
rights had been violated. Instead, due to the partial public use of the
premises and the implied dedication to that extent, no rights of the owner
were found to have been violated and thus no trespass resulted.128 In
effect, the court seemed to be stating that once the camp is opened to the
public, property rights do not include the right to arbitrarily deny some
visitors access to the camp.
Folgueras v. Hassle129 represents another large step forward in establishing the right of migrants and visitors to free access to and from the
labor camps. The constitutional aspects of this decision have already
been discussed in conjunction with Marsh.30 That part of the decision
dealing with the constitutional questions was, however, an alternative
holding. After finding that access would be guaranteed by the Constitution, the decision clearly established that property law dictates the same
result. Commenting on the recently decided Shack case, the court stated:
This court concurs with the New Jersey court in concluding that the property rights
of the camp owner do not include the right to deny access to his camps to guests or
persons working for any governmental or private agency whose primary objective is
181
the health, welfare or dignity of the migrant workers as human beings.

The decision in Folgueras also firmly established that the migrant
farm workers were tenants and as such entitled to "invite and associate
with guests of the tenant's own choosing."' 3 2 In conclusion the court
stated:
Whether the court regards the question of access to migrant labor camps as one of
constitutional law, the rights surrounding the ownership of real property or the rights
of tenants in relation to their landlord, the law compels a single conclusion. The
126. 65 Misc. 2d 453, 318 N.Y.S.2d 40 (Cayuga County Ct. 1971).
127.
128.

Id. at 455-56, 318 N.Y.S.2d at 43.

130.

See text accompanying notes 56-60 supra.

Id. at 456-58, 318 N.Y.S.2d at 44-46.
129. 331 F. Supp. 615 (W.D. Mich. 1971).
131. -331

132.

F. Supp. at 624.

Id. at 625.
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fundamental underlying principle is simply that real property ownership does not
vest the owner with dominion over the lives of those people living on his property.
The migrants who travel across the country to work in the grower's fields and live
on the grower's property are clothed with their full bundle of rights as citizens and
human beings. They may not be held in servitude or peonage, and they are not serfs.
They are, however, citizens of the United States and tenants. As such they are
entitled to the kinds of communications, associations, and friendships guaranteed to
all citizens, and secured by the Constitution. The owner's property rights do not divest
the migrants of these rights. 13a
Judicial action is not the only area in which attempts have been made
to aid the migrant. Legislation has been enacted, both on the federal and
state levels, which is designed to improve camp conditions 1 ' and eradicate
disreputable practices by crew leaders. 35 More important, the United
States Department of Justice has become increasingly involved in attempts to insure access to the camps. 3 0

VII.

CONCLUSION

The courts can no longer ignore the obvious fictional quality of the
grower-owner's claim for protection of his "private" property, but should
instead recognize the fact that the camp is the only "home" the migrants
know. If the migrant worker has no safeguards for his freedoms of speech
and assembly while he is housed in the labor camps, in which the majority
of his life is spent, these freedoms have no reality for him.
The need for improvement in the migrants' status is apparent, as is the
necessity of achieving "open" camps in order to establish the conditions
which are requisite to that improvement. The means to that achievement
are several and the likelihood of success varies with each method and
each given set of circumstances. The constitutional attacks, based on a
finding of state action and an interference with communicative rights or
upon a finding of peonage, appear likely to arise only when restrictions are
either very loose or very tight. The additional necessity of showing state
involvement when claiming a violation of the migrant's first amendment
rights is a burden which will often be difficult to overcome.
Attempts to unionize the migrant workers do not appear likely to
succeed, at least not in the near future. Legislative aid is often piecemeal
133. Id. at 625.
134. See, e.g., the recent statutes passed in New Jersey, Acts of June 7, 1971, chs. 193 &
195, [1971] N.J. Laws 754, 756.
135. See 7 U.S.C. §§ 2041-53 (1970); Act of June 7, 1971, ch. 192, [19711 N.J. Las
751.
136. N.Y. Times, Nov. 8, 1970, § 1, at 50, coL 1. See also the recent appropriations to
be given to help ameliorate working and living conditions of migrant workers. Id., June 20,
1971, § 1, at 28, col. 1.
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and seldom of any help with regard to access problems. The recent trend
in general property law away from the absolute rights of ownership and
toward the expansion of individual civil rights seems to offer the greatest
hope for eliminating restrictions on access. Decisions such as Shack and
Folgueras indicate a growing awareness of the problem on the part of
progressive tribunals.
Conceptual vestiges of medieval English conditions have enveloped
the fee in a Stygian mist of inviolability. The realities of the modern
world bear no resemblance to those ancient considerations, and the law
should attune itself to the change. The communicative activities protected
by the Constitution should be recognized as equally guaranteed to the
inhabitants of the camps by modern principles of property law. The
rights which accompany the ownership in property do not include the
right to isolate and impede the migrant.

